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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Shah Rahman, now the appellant, brought this federal 
securities class action on March 22, 2011, against defendant Kid 
Brands, Inc., a New Jersey corporation, and against the 
individual defendants, Bruce G. Crain, Guy A. Paglinco, and 
Raphael Benaroya, officers of Kid Brands (collectively with Kid 
Brands “appellees”).  Kid Brands is in the business of importing 
inexpensive infant furniture and products for the purpose of 
ultimate resale to consumers.  The complaint alleged that 
defendants, now appellees, violated (1) Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act (the “Exchange Act”) and SEC Rule 
10b-5 and (2) and Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.  In 
  5 
particular, the complaint alleged that defendants misled 
investors by artificially inflating Kid Brands stock price by 
issuing deceptive public financial reports and press releases 
dealing with Kid Brands’ compliance with customs laws and 
overall financial performance.  The putative class included 
Rahman and all others similarly situated who purchased or 
obtained Kid Brands common stock between March 26, 2010, 
and August 16, 2011, inclusive (the “class period”).     
 Subsequently, Rahman filed a first amended complaint 
(“FAC”) which the District Court dismissed without prejudice 
on defendants’ motion, on March 8, 2012, in an order that 
permitted Rahman to file an amended complaint within 60 days. 
 Rahman v. Kid Brands, Inc., Civ. No. 11-1624, 2012 WL 
762311 (D.N.J. Mar. 8, 2012).  On May 7, 2012, Rahman timely 
filed a second amended complaint (“SAC”) alleging that, in 
addition to customs violations, defendants failed to disclose 
product recalls, safety violations, and illegal staffing practices 
affecting Kid Brands.  Nevertheless, Rahman’s brief focuses 
almost exclusively on the customs violations and makes only 
passing reference to the other issues.  On October 17, 2012, on 
defendants’ motion the District Court dismissed the SAC with 
prejudice because it did not satisfy the heightened scienter 
pleading standard required by the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act (“PSLRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).  In its opinion 
the Court explained that “upon a holistic consideration of the re-
labeling allegations contained in the SAC, the Court finds that a 
reasonable person would not deem the inference of scienter at 
least as strong as any opposing inference.”  J.A. at 28.  On 
November 14, 2012, Rahman filed a timely notice of appeal.   
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 Kid Brands operates through four wholly owned 
subsidiaries: Kids Line, LLC, Sassy, Inc., LaJobi, Inc., and 
CoCaLo, Inc.
1
  Kid Brands primarily imports the inexpensive 
furniture in which it deals from China for ultimate resale to the 
public.  Kid Brands is a substantial business as its net sales in 
2010 were $276,000,000.  Under “anti-dumping” laws, Kid 
Brands is subject to duties that the United States imposes 
beyond those ordinarily assessed to discourage the importation 
of some products at very low cost.   During the class period, 
Crain was the president and chief executive officer of Kid 
Brands and served on its board of directors, and Paglinco was its 
vice president and chief financial officer.  Paglinco retained 
both positions after the close of the class period.  In September 
2011, after the close of the class period, Benaroya, previously an 
outside director, was appointed interim chief executive officer.    
 The SAC alleges that Kid Brands obscured the origin of 
its Chinese-manufactured products to reduce import duties and 
increase profits, and then made misleading statements regarding 
its financial health.  Rahman supported the SAC with statements 
from six confidential witnesses who had been employees of Kid 
Brands or its subsidiaries.
2
  Rahman believes that the statements 
                                                 
1
 We take the facts primarily from the SAC, Rahman’s brief, and 
the District Court’s opinion dismissing Rahman’s FAC without 
prejudice.  We note that the District Court’s opinions set forth 
the facts in greater detail than we do. 
 
2
 Notwithstanding the reference to the employees as confidential 
witnesses, it is difficult to understand how given the details of 
the witnesses’ employment that Rahman set forth in the SAC, 
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support his contention that defendants engaged in repeated 
violations of customs laws.  He described the witnesses in the 
SAC as follows:  
• CW1: A former LaJobi employee who worked in the 
outbound shipping department from March 2010–March 2012 
and dealt with the products entering and exiting the distribution 
center.   
• CW2: A former LaJobi employee who worked in the 
recovering and shipping department from June 2011–January 
2012 and dealt with inbound and outbound shipments of 
products.   
• CW3: A former LaJobi distribution manager who worked 
for the company from May 2000–November 2010.  CW3 
oversaw safety and security at a Cranbury, New Jersey, 
warehouse and dealt with the packing slips.   
• CW4: A former Kid Brands employee who worked in the 
internal auditing department as a Sarbanes Oxley consultant 
from March 2004–August 2009 and reviewed the internal 
financial information for Kid Brands and its subsidiaries. 
• CW5: A former LaJobi sales and forecast demand 
manager who worked at the company from March 2010–April 
2011.  CW5 had personal knowledge and familiarity with the 
subsidiary’s operations, database and inventory tools.   
• CW6: A former Kids Line employee who worked in 
                                                                                                             
that Kid Brands could not be aware of their identities. 
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packaging design from June 2011–March 2012 and whose 
statements relate to his discharge from that employment. 
 The immediate event that led to this litigation occurred in 
December 2010, when U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
informed Kid Brands that it was conducting a “Focused 
Assessment” of its import practices and procedures.  Following 
this notification, Kid Brands’ board of directors initiated an 
investigation of Kid Brands’ practices and, for that purpose, 
hired the outside law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & 
Flom.  Kid Brands, however, did not publicly disclose that it 
was subject to the Focused Assessment or that it had hired the 
law firm until after it received a report from the firm.  
Eventually on March 15, 2011, Kid Brands revealed that LaJobi 
had violated United States law by misidentifying the 
manufacturer and shipper of certain products, that it had 
discharged two LaJobi employees, and that it anticipated 
needing to pay $7 million in fines and charges to resolve issues 
largely arising from the Focused Assessment.  As might be 
expected, this information had a negative impact on Kid Brands’ 
stock price.  Thus, at the end of the day on March 15, 2011, Kid 
Brands’ stock closed at $6.91 a share, a large drop from its prior 
day closing price of $9.24.  Five months later, on August 15, 
2011, Kid Brands filed a federal Form 10-Q for the quarter 
ending June 30, 2011, in which it indicated that CoCaLo and 
Kids Line also had evaded custom duties.  The next day, August 
16, 2011, Kid Brands issued a Form 8-K that estimated its total 
liabilities to be in excess of $10 million for wrongful practices 
extending over a period of nearly five years.  Kid Brands’ stock 
closed at $4.49 per share on August 15, 2011, at $3.65 the 
following day, and at $2.97 on August 22, 2011.       
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II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 78aa and we have jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review of the District 
Court’s order of dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  
In conducting that review, we accept Rahman’s allegations in 
the SAC as true and review the complaint in its entirety.  See 
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322, 
127 S.Ct. 2499, 2509 (2007).  But in this process we recognize 
that, when alleging a securities fraud cause of action, a plaintiff 
“must satisfy the heightened pleading rules codified in the 
PSLRA.”  Institutional Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 
242, 252 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 
III.  DISCUSSION 
 The PSLRA established heightened pleading 
requirements for a plaintiff to meet in order to plead a cause of 
action successfully in class actions alleging securities fraud.  
Thus, it requires that a complaint “‘state with particularity both 
the facts constituting the alleged violation, and the facts 
evidencing scienter, i.e., the defendant’s intention ‘to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud.’”3  Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 313, 127 S.Ct. at 
                                                 
3
 The PSLRA replaced Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) as the applicable 
pleading standard in private securities class actions.  See Avaya, 
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2504.  To satisfy the latter requirement, a plaintiff must ‘“state 
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the 
defendant acted with the required state of mind.”’  Id. at 314, 
127 S.Ct. at 2504 (emphasis added) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(b)(2)).  In Tellabs, in holding that the investors bringing a 
securities fraud class action had failed to meet that standard, the 
Supreme Court explained: “[t]o qualify as ‘strong’ within the 
intendment of [15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)] . . . an inference of 
scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable–it 
must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing 
inference of nonfraudulent intent.”  Id. at 314, 127 S.Ct. at 
2504-05.   
 Pursuant to its authority under Section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act, the SEC issued Rule 10b-5, which renders it 
unlawful for any person: 
 (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to 
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made . . . not misleading, or  
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business 
                                                                                                             
564 F.3d at 253.  Nonetheless, “Rule 9(b)’s particularity 
requirement is comparable to and effectively subsumed by the 
requirements of [15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) of] the PSLRA.”  Id. 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  “The PSLRA’s 
requirement for pleading scienter, on the other hand, marks a 
sharp break with Rule 9(b).”  Id.  
  11 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale 
of any security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.   
 The Supreme Court long has construed the rule to 
provide a basis for individuals to bring private securities fraud 
actions on behalf of putative classes.  Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 318, 
172 S.Ct. at 2507.  To state a Rule 10(b) claim, plaintiffs “must 
‘allege defendants made a misstatement or an omission of 
material fact with scienter in connection with the purchase or the 
sale of a security upon which plaintiffs reasonably relied and 
plaintiff[s’] reliance was the proximate cause of their injury.”’  
Avaya, 564 F.3d at 251 (quoting Winer Family Trust v. Queen, 
503 F.3d 319, 326 (3d Cir. 2007)).  Under the PSLRA’s 
heightened pleading standard, a private securities complaint 
involving an allegedly “false or misleading statement must: (1) 
‘specify each statement alleged to have been misleading [and] 
the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading,’ 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1), and (2) ‘state with particularity facts 
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with 
the required state of mind,’ § 78u-4(b)(2).”  Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 
321, 127 S.Ct. at 2508.  The required state of mind is “scienter,” 
which the Supreme Court has defined as ‘“a mental state 
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”’4  Tellabs, 
                                                 
4
 Although we read the SAC primarily to be based on a claim 
that defendants engaged in actual wrongdoing, it does allege that 
they had been reckless and, in Rahman’s brief, he states that 
during the class period defendants “knew or recklessly 
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551 U.S. at 319, 127 S.Ct. at 2507 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 & n.12, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 1381 
& n.12 (1976)). 
 The District Court found that some, but not all, of 
defendants’ statements satisfied the first, i.e., materiality prong 
of the PSLRA’s heightened pleading requirements.  An 
allegation of materiality is crucial because “[t]he first 
requirement under the PSLRA obliges a plaintiff to specify each 
allegedly misleading statement, the reason or reasons why the 
statement is misleading, and, if an allegation is made on 
information and belief, all facts supporting that belief with 
particularity.”  Avaya, 564 F.3d at 259 (citations omitted).5  An 
                                                                                                             
disregarded” the circumstance that statements that Kid Brands 
published “were materially false and misleading . . . .”  
Appellant’s br. at 9.  Thus, this case to some degree can be 
viewed as a recklessness case.  In order to state a Rule 10b-5 
claim, ‘“[a] reckless statement is one involving not merely 
simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme 
departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which 
presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either 
known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have 
been aware of it.”’  Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 
470, 493 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Avaya, 564 F.3d at 267 n.42).  
But even though our opinion essentially addresses allegations 
that defendants intended to act wrongfully, to the extent that 
Rahman based the SAC on a recklessness theory our result is the 
same.   
  
5
 Fraudulent statements by employees sometime can be imputed 
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allegation that a defendant uttered an immaterial statement will 
not satisfy the requirement that the complaint include a “false or 
misleading statement.”6 
   In considering the SAC, the District Court indicated that 
it did not believe that a jury could find fault with Kid Brands’ 
delay in the disclosure of the information regarding LaJobi’s 
misidentification of the manufacturer and shipper of its products 
until March 15, 2011.  The Court reached this conclusion taking 
into account “[d]efendants’ efforts to investigate the matter 
through an independent law firm and the practical 
considerations regarding the timing of the disclosures.”  J.A. at 
9.  On the other hand, the Court held that the delayed August 
2011 disclosure regarding the other subsidiaries’ violations “was 
sufficiently misleading and [as] such could be found material by 
a jury.”  Id.   
 Though we are inclined to agree with the District Court’s 
latter but not former conclusion, we do not make a definitive 
holding on the point as we have no need to do so.  We think that 
Rahman makes a strong argument when he contends that a jury 
reasonably could have found fault under Rule 10b-5 with Kid 
                                                                                                             
to their employers “because [a] corporation is liable for 
statements by employees who have apparent authority to make 
them.”  Avaya, 564 F.3d at 252 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 
6
 Appellees do not contend that any statements in issue in this 
case were forward-looking and therefore protected by the 
PSLRA’s safe harbor provision.  See Avaya, 564 F.3d at 254.  
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Brands’ failure to disclose the Focused Assessment and the 
resultant internal investigation prior to March 15, 2011, 
inasmuch as this information was available to Kid Brands before 
that date and surely was negative.  Of course, we recognize that 
in explaining its conclusion the District Court referenced Kid 
Brands’ “practical considerations” for delaying the 
announcement.  Yet the Court did not detail these considerations 
beyond indicating the need for Kid Brands to investigate the 
matter to give out accurate information.  Id.
7
  Arguably Kid 
Brands should have released information with respect to the 
Focused Assessment and internal investigation on a tentative 
basis before March 15, 2011.    
 But our possible partial disagreement with the District 
Court ultimately does not matter because we agree with it that 
Rahman failed to plead scienter with sufficient particularity.  
We explained in Avaya that “under the PSLRA’s ‘[e]xacting’ 
pleading standard for scienter, ‘any private securities complaint 
alleging that the defendant made a false or misleading statement 
must . . . state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong 
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of 
mind.’”  564 F.3d at 253 (quoting Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 313, 320, 
127 S.Ct. at 2504, 2508 (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
Rahman relied on the evidence from the confidential witnesses 
that we have described to plead scienter in the SAC.
8
  In 
                                                 
7
 In its conclusions in its October 17, 2012 opinion the District 
Court incorporated some conclusions from its March 8, 2012 
opinion. 
 
8
 We note that “[w]here, as here, plaintiffs lack documentary 
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California Public Employees Retirement  System v. Chubb 
Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 146 (3d Cir. 2004), which we decided prior 
to Tellabs, we adopted the following standard dealing with such 
evidence from Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 314 (2d Cir. 
2000): 
[W]here plaintiffs rely on confidential personal 
sources but also on other facts, they need not 
name their sources as long as the latter facts 
provide an adequate basis for believing that the 
defendants’ statements were false.  Moreover, 
even if personal sources must be identified, there 
is no requirement that they be named, provided 
they are described in the complaint with sufficient 
particularity to support the probability that a 
person in the position occupied by the source 
would possess the information alleged.  
 We have continued to apply this standard even after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Tellabs.  In Avaya, we explained 
that when dealing with confidential witnesses, courts should 
assess the ‘“detail provided by the confidential sources, the 
sources’ basis of knowledge, the reliability of the sources, the 
                                                                                                             
evidence such as internal memoranda, ‘reliance on confidential 
sources to supply the requisite particularity for their fraud claims 
. . . assumes a heightened importance.”’  Avaya, 564 F.3d at 261 
(quoting California Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 
F.3d 126, 148 (3d Cir. 2004)).  Documentary evidence is not 
required, but it could bolster the accounts of the confidential 
witnesses. 
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corroborative nature of other facts alleged, including from other 
sources, the coherence and plausibility of the allegations, and 
similar indicia.’”9  Avaya, 564 F.3d at 261 (quoting Chubb, 394 
F.3d at 147).  If, after that assessment, “anonymous source 
allegations are found wanting with respect to these criteria . . . 
[courts] must discount them steeply.”  Id. at 263.  We explained 
in Avaya that such a discount “is consistent with Tellabs’s 
teaching that omissions and ambiguities count against inferring 
scienter under the PSLRA’s particularity requirements,” but if 
“a complaint’s confidential witness allegations are adequately 
particularized, we will not dismiss them simply on account of 
their anonymity.”  Id. (footnote omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  We concur with the District Court’s conclusion 
that such discounting is necessary in this case.      
 Regarding the customs duty violations, CW1 stated that 
he was in charge of re-labeling furniture from China with 
stickers containing a different country of origin, and CW2 
confirmed his account.  According to both witnesses, director of 
operations Myles McGrath demonstrated how to apply the new 
labels, and another manager (referred to only as “Brenda”) 
provided the labels.
10
  According to CW2, this practice “was a 
                                                 
9
 “Of course, confidential witness allegations may score highly 
on the Chubb test yet fail either to establish the falsity of a 
statement, or to give rise to a strong inference of scienter.  
Nonetheless, for analytical purposes, it is important to 
distinguish deficiencies relating to the content of allegations 
from those relating to their form.”  Avaya, 564 F.3d at 263 n.33.  
   
10
 “LaJobi employees would take boxes off a pallet, and put on 
  17 
normal process the whole time [he] was there,” and the Kid 
Brands CEO and CFO toured LaJobi and met with the 
management team bimonthly.  J.A. at 207 (SAC ¶ 39).  CW2 
alleged that LaJobi management conferred with the Kid Brands 
leadership in McGrath’s office about the protocol for altering 
the country of origin labels, and that Brenda moved the labels 
from her office into McGrath’s office for the meetings.  But the 
problem with CW2’s allegations is that CW2 did not begin 
working for LaJobi until June 2011, so CW2 cannot have 
personal knowledge regarding the pre-investigation violations.
11
 
 Moreover, as far as we can ascertain, neither CW2 nor CW1 
had any way of knowing what was discussed in those closed-
door meetings between the LaJobi and Kid Brands leadership.  
Furthermore, the witnesses do not provide any dates for the 
                                                                                                             
new yellow and white labels (white labels on two sides and a 
yellow on the short side), which would obscure the ‘Made in 
China’ labels.”  J.A. at 207 (SAC ¶ 39).  We are uncertain 
whether the new labels revealed different countries of origin or 
different locations/manufacturers within China.    
 
11
 Nonetheless, we recognize that in Avaya we approvingly cited 
to our earlier opinion in In re Merck & Co., Inc. Securities 
Litigation in which we noted: “[B]oth post-class-period data and 
pre-class data could be used to confirm what a defendant should 
have known during the class period because [a]ny information 
that sheds light on whether class period statements were false or 
materially misleading is relevant.”  Avaya, 564 F.3d at 249 n.13 
(quoting Merck, 432 F.3d 261, 272 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted)).   
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meetings, explain how they would know that the labels were 
moved from one office to another, or claim to have attended any 
of the meetings or even entered any of the management offices.   
    CW5 offers general information regarding meetings 
between the Kid Brands and LaJobi leadership including the Kid 
Brands CEO.  Yet the fact that a CEO visited a subsidiary’s 
premises to meet with its president will not establish that the 
CEO had knowledge of illegal activities at the subsidiary.  After 
all, it would be expected that the CEO would visit his 
company’s subsidiaries in the course of conducting legitimate 
business.  CW3 provides even more abstract commentary, 
suggesting that he and his coworkers in the LaJobi distribution 
center “ha[d] a feeling something suspicious was going on.”12  
J.A. at 208 (SAC ¶ 42).  CW6, the only confidential witness 
from Kids Line, was enmeshed in an employment dispute that 
had no bearing on the customs violations in question.  Of all the 
confidential witnesses, the statements of CW4 were the most 
plausible and he was in a position to have what was potentially 
the most damaging information.  Yet even CW4, who allegedly 
spent more than five years reviewing Kid Brands’ internal 
financial information, offers little more than generalized 
allegations with few specifics and even less concrete support.  
                                                 
12
 The SAC actually states: “CW3 noted that at all times during 
his/her tenure at LaJobi ‘there were rumors that things weren’t 
on the up and up.’  CW3 had ‘a strange feeling that things 
weren’t right’ with regard to the Company’s customs practices.” 
 J.A. at 208 (SAC ¶ 42). 
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 It also is significant that Rahman did not demonstrate that 
the individual defendants had a motive for their wrongful 
conduct.  Though it is not necessary to plead motive to establish 
that a defendant acted with scienter, its presence can be 
persuasive when conducting a holistic review of the evidence.  
See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 325-26, 127 S.Ct. at 2511.  Of course, 
“[m]otives that are generally possessed by most corporate 
directors and officers do not suffice; instead, plaintiffs must 
assert a concrete and personal benefit to the individual 
defendants resulting from this fraud.”13  Avaya, 564 F.3d at 278 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Here, 
Rahman has failed to plead facts to support an assertion that the 
individual defendants had a motive to engage in wrongful 
conduct.  
 In considering the adequacy of the SAC under the 
PSLRA, we must address the doctrine of “corporate scienter,” 
alternatively referred to as “collective scienter.”  A plaintiff can 
use corporate or collective scienter to plead an inference of 
scienter against a corporate defendant without raising the same 
inferences required to attribute scienter to an individual 
defendant.  See Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 
736, 743 (9th Cir. 2008).
14
  We, however, neither have accepted 
                                                 
13
 “Corporate officers always have an incentive to improve the 
lot of their companies, but this is not, absent unusual 
circumstances, a motive to commit fraud.”  Avaya, 564 F.3d at 
279. 
 
14
 See also Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. 
Dynex Capital Inc., 531 F.3d 190, 195 (2d Cir. 2008) (“In most 
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nor rejected the doctrine of corporate scienter in securities fraud 
actions, and we do not do so now because the allegations in the 
SAC cannot support the existence of corporate or collective 
scienter.  For comparison, we refer to City of Monroe 
Employees Retirement System v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 
651 (6th Cir. 2005), a case that does recognize the adequacy of a 
claim of corporate scienter.  In Bridgestone, the plaintiff alleged 
that a corporate subsidiary of the defendant engaged in a 
massive cover-up to hide the fact that tires it manufactured were 
rupturing and causing a high number of accidents.  Id. at 656-59. 
 But in this case, there is no credible evidence to suggest that 
Kid Brands covered up the customs violations at its subsidiaries. 
 Quite to the contrary, when U.S. Customs notified Kid Brands 
of the Focused Assessment, Kid Brands hired an outside law 
firm to conduct an internal investigation and, when it received a 
report from the firm, it publicly disclosed both the existence of 
the Focused Assessment and the remedial steps it had taken.  
Thus, even if we recognize the doctrine of corporate scienter, 
this case would not come within the doctrine and the SAC 
would not survive the motion to dismiss. 
 Rahman also relies on Avaya, in which we recognized a 
core operations doctrine in a case in which the CEO and CFO of 
a communications company affirmatively denied the existence 
of intense price competition at a time when the company 
                                                                                                             
cases, the most straightforward way to raise such an inference 
for a corporate defendant will be to plead it for an individual 
defendant.  But it is possible to raise the required inference with 
regard to a corporate defendant without doing so with regard to 
a specific individual defendant.”).   
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actively was granting steep price discounts.  We acknowledged 
the shareholders’ contention “that since competition, pricing 
policies, and pricing concessions [were] ‘core matters’ of central 
importance to Avaya and its principal executives, a ‘core 
operations inference’ supports scienter.”  Avaya, 564 F.3d at 
268 (emphasis added).  But reliance on Avaya is unavailing in 
this case because in Avaya the individuals who denied that there 
was intense competition were responding to pointed inquiries 
from analysts during multiple conference calls that addressed 
pricing problems.  No such circumstances are present here.   
 Moreover, even aside from its factual differences, Avaya 
has limited precedential value in this case because in Avaya we 
cited approvingly to an opinion of the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit in Metzler Investment GMBA v. Corinthian 
Colleges. Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1068 (9th Cir. 2008).  Metzler 
recited that ‘“corporate management’s general awareness of the 
day-to-day workings of the company’s business does not 
establish scienter–at least absent some additional allegations of 
specific information conveyed to management and related to 
fraud.”’  Id. at 270.  We also point out that the core operations 
doctrine cannot apply because, in spite of customs violations at 
three of the four Kid Brands subsidiaries, the $10 million in 
anticipated liabilities covering wrongful conduct over a nearly 
five-year span cannot be regarded as affecting the “core 
operations” of a company that had hundreds of millions of 
dollars in annual net sales.                
 In reaching our result we recognize that in Tellabs the 
Supreme Court described a scienter inquiry as addressing the 
question of “whether all of the facts alleged, taken collectively, 
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give rise to a strong inference of scienter, not whether any 
individual allegation, scrutinized in isolation, meets that 
standard.”  Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 323, 127 S.Ct. at 2509 
(emphasis in original).  In conducting this inquiry, a court must 
weigh “plausible opposing inferences” by comparing competing 
conclusions that can be drawn from the facts.
15
  Id. at 323, 127 
S.Ct. at 2509.  Yet the Supreme Court warned that “[t]he 
inference that the defendant acted with scienter need not be 
irrefutable, i.e., of the ‘smoking-gun’ genre, or even the ‘most 
plausible of competing inferences.’”  Id. at 324, 127 S.Ct. at 
2510 (citation omitted).  Nonetheless, we find that the District 
Court properly reviewed the complaint in its entirety and 
rightfully found that the SAC failed to meet the heightened 
pleading requirements of the PSLRA. 
 Finally, Rahman asserts a claim for controlling person 
liability against the individual defendants under 20(a) of the 
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a).  But, as we explained in 
Avaya, such liability “is derivative of an underlying violation of 
Section 10(b) by the controlled person.”  Avaya, 564 F.3d at 
252.  Inasmuch as there cannot be Section 10(b) liability here, 
                                                 
15
 “The strength of an inference cannot be decided in a vacuum. 
 The inquiry is inherently comparative: How likely is it that one 
conclusion, as compared to others, follows from the underlying 
facts?”  Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 323, 127 S.Ct. at 2510.  The 
Supreme Court added: “[T]he inference of scienter must be 
more than merely ‘reasonable’ or ‘permissible’– it must be 
cogent and compelling, thus strong in light of other 
explanations.”  Id., 127 S.Ct. at 2510.    
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the individual defendants cannot be liable under Section 20(b).
16
 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
District Court’s order of October 17, 2012, dismissing 
Rahman’s second amended complaint with prejudice.     
                                                 
16
 Appellees contend that we can affirm because Rahman did not 
plead loss causation adequately.  We, however, do not address 
this point as we are affirming the District Court order dismissing 
the SAC on scienter grounds. 
